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the Circuits" column,' the U.S.
sCourt
reported
in a recent
"News
from
Federal
for the
ofAppeals
Circuit, in two recent decisions, Cushman
v. Shinseki, 576 E3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
and Gambill v. Shinseki, 576 E3d 1307
(Fed. Cir. 2009), held that the protections
of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause apply to applicants for veterans
disability benefits. Shortly after those two
decisions, a third decision, Edwards v.
Shinseki, 582 F3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009),
followed the Cushman precedent, but in
this case the author of the opinion for the
court,Judge Randall Rader, also penned
a separate opinion in which he offered
"additional views" expressing his agreement "with the result" but also asserting
his strong disagreement with Cushman
on the grounds that the Supreme Court
has never squarely addressed the issue
of whether applicants for government
benefits have a property (or liberty) interest sufficient to allow them to invoke
due process protections and that, to the
extent this issue has come up, a plurality
of the Court has seemingly indicated that
applicants lack such interests.
I wish to highlight some of the larger
implications of these cases for administrative and constitutional law.In the
end, I conclude that the Cushman decision is not a departure from the way
that most appeals courts have dealt with
due process in the application context,
though whether the Supreme Court
would be willing to go along with
the mainstream view,if the issue were
squarely presented, is an open question.
* Professor of Practice in Administrative
Law,Washington College of LawAmerican
University. This article is adapted from remarks
made at a Section program,"Due Process Issues
inVeterans' Cases after Cushman v Shinseki"
co-sponsored by the law firm Finnegan,
Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner LLP

(Jan. 12,2010).
1 SeeWilliam S.Jordan, III, Neivsfrom the Circuits,
35 ADmiN. & RN. L. NEws 16 (Winter 2010)
(describing the Cushman ad Ganbill decisions).
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Let's start with the fundamentals.The
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments provide that
the government may not "deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process oflaw."The key words
for the purpose of this discussion are
"deprive" and "property."
In plain English, to be deprived of
something, one must presumably possess
it first. It would follow,then, that to
trigger procedural due process, one must
presumably claim that the state is depriving him or her of a possessory interest in
property or liberty
Until 1970, the concept of property in
the Supreme Court's jurisprudence was
relatively limited to real property, money,
and tangible things-items a person
might possess in the ordinary sense of
the word. If such property were taken
away by the state, the person suffering
the deprivation generally had a right to
a trial-type hearing.The hearing might
need to be held before the deprivation, but it could also be afterwards if
there were no irreparable harm in doing
so-i.e., if there were a make-whole
remedy of some sort that could be
provided after the fact.
But starting with the landmark cases
of Goldberg v. Kelly in 1970 and Board
of Regents v. Roth in 1972, the Supreme
Court began to recognize the concept
of"entitlements" to continued government benefits such as welfare benefits
or a tenured government job as a type
ofproperty for the purposes of the Due
Process Clause that could not be taken
away without a fair hearing.This was
true even though such entitlements were
not really possessed in the same way as
traditional property-they could not, for
example, be given away, sold, subdivided,
or devolved through inheritance.While
it was true that some entitlements, such
as the welfare benefits in Goldberg,were
provided for as a matter of state statutory
law, others, such as the government job
at issue in Roth, were not. Nevertheless,

in the latter case, the Court recognized
that an employee could have an implied
entitlement if he or she had regulatory
or contractual protection from removal
except for good cause.
The concept of entitlements grew
to include the right to a continuation
of public education, public housing,
and other government benefits such
as social security, food stamps, Medicaid, and veterans' benefits. In each of
these contexts federal courts held that
if someone has been granted the right
to receive such benefits, they couldn't
be revoked (at least on individual, nonprogrammatic grounds) without due
process.After all, at that point there
would certainly be a deprivation.
This broad expansion of the concept of
property (and a parallel expansion of the
concept ofliberty by the Supreme Court)
led to an examination of what process was
due in these various situations. In Goldbep,
the Court ruled that the beneficiary had
to be given a pre-termination, trial-type
hearing before welfare benefits were taken
away.That was understandable due to
what the Court called the "brutal need" of
beneficiaries for these subsistence benefits.
But, unfortunately, the cost of such hearings led NewYork City-the defendant
in that case--to make policy changes that
made it harder for beneficiaries to get on
the welfare rolls in the first place because
it had become so much harder to remove
them later on.
The somewhat unsatisfactory unin-

tended consequences of Goldbergand the
realization that not every type of deprivation of an entitlement would warrant
a trial-type hearing led the Supreme
Court, a scant six years later, to pull back
from Goldberg in the case of Mathews v.

Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), in which
the Court developed its famous threeprong balancing test for determining
what process was due, once a property or
liberty deprivation was found.
After Mathews, courts have had to
balance (1) the importance of the
Volume 35, Number 3

private interest involved in the case, (2)
the risk of error without the soughtafter additional procedures, and (3) the
government's interest, including an interest in avoiding the cost of the additional
procedures. In applying its new formula
in the Mathews case itself,the Court
held that social security beneficiaries did
not have a right to the pre-ternination
trial-type hearing that was granted to the
welfare beneficiaries in Goldberg.Instead
a post-termination hearing sufficed.
Thus, after Math(ws, the procedural due
process decisionnaking sequence was
set-first a property or liberty deprivation
would have to be shown and, if it were,
the Mathews balancing test would be used
to decide what process was due.This was
all fairly clear for persons claiming that the
government was taking away entitlements
they had already been receiving, but what
about applicantsfor these benefits?
Professors Michael Asimow and Ron
Levin have explained the so-called
"endowment effect":"There is a comion
sense difference between the rejection of
an application and termination of an existing status.We are more outraged when we
lose ajob for unjust reasons than when we
are not hired for unjust reasons. Similarly,
our life is probably more disrupted when
we lose a license than when our license
application is rejected.' 2
But does this mean that applicants for
an entitlement should have no due process
rights at all because they haven't been
deprived of anything in a narrow traditional sense? That doesn't seem to be an
appropriate result.
Perhaps a better way to frame the
issue is to ask two discrete questions (and
again I owe this formulation to Professor
Levin). The first question is the broader
one raised by Judge Rader:Assumning
that a statute confers an entitlement to
a benefit, must the government afford a
due process right to a fair hearing before
it can make afinal decision rejecting an
applicant's claim for those benefits? A
2 MICHAEL AsiMow & RONALD M. LEVIN,
TEACHERS MANUAL TO STATE AND FEDERAL

ADMINISTRATIv

LAW 25 (3d ed. 2009)

(emphasis in original).
3 E-mail from Ronald Levin,April 2,2009, to
adninlaw@chicagokent.kentlaxs edu (adninistrative law listserv) as part of a discussion of
whether applicants have a right to due process.
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second, narrower question is whether
the government can deny benefits to an
applicant temporarily,while a controversy
over his right to payments is pending?
This is really a question of the timing of
the benefits vis a vis the hearing.
It is certainly true that the broader,
general question of whether first-tirne
applicants can have a property interest has
not been decided by the Supreme Court.
It was expressly reserved in Walters v.
Radiation Suwivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985),
a case that challenged the statutory $10
fee linitation in veterans cases.And a few
years laterJustice O'Connor dissented
from the denial of certiorari in a case that
raised the question directly. See Gregory
v. Town of Pittsfield, 470 U.S. 1018,1018
(1985) (O'ConnorJ., dissenting).
In 1999, however, the Court decided a
case which did not reach the broad question but seemed to provide an affirmative
answer to the second question.The case
is the one cited by Judge Rader-American ManfacturersMutual Insurance Co. v.
Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40 (1999).
This case concerned the Pennsylvania workers' compensation law,which
provided that employees would receive
payment ofreasonable and necessary
medical expenses for on-the-job injuries.
If, however, the employer or insurance
company thought that the medical procedure that formed the basis for the claim
was not reasonable or necessary,it could
refuse to pay until the issue was decided
after a"utilization review" hearing.A
further de novo appeal of a denial could
be taken by the employee to aworkers'
compensation judge.This, of course, takes
time, so employees argued they were entitled to pre-review payments as a matter of
due process.The Supreme Court decided
that due process was not applicable
because the case involved a private insurance company-i.e., no state action-but
because it disagreed with the lower court's
reasoning, it also discussed the due process
issues that might have arisen had it been
state action.
The Court could have disposed of
that question by simply finding that
the Mathews v. Eldridgebalancing test
would have required payment only qfter
a hearing, but instead a plurality of the
Court went out ofits way to say that
due process would not apply because the

applicants were in a very different position fiom the beneficiaries in Goldberg
and Mathews, who were trying to protect
a continuation of their benefits.
Thus, what the Court really did in
American ManufacturersMutual Insurance
was allow a temporarydenial oflbenefits
while eligibility was being determined, but
it did not really squarely answer the question ofwhether the government could
make afinal decision rejecting an applicant's clain for those benefits without due
process. Indeed, in that case, a hearing was
available before the final determination.
Justice Ginsburg concurred in the
temporary denial, but she did so while
also specifically confronting the question
of whether a final denial of benefits could
be made without due process-and she
said no to that.
I have to say that her view certainly
seems right, because the contrary viewthat due process does not apply at all to
applicants for statutory benefits-would,
if taken to its logical extension, mean
that it would be constitutional for the
government to treat some applications
unfairly, shred half of them, throw some
in the trash unread, or subject them to a
process tainted with corrupt practices.
Another way of viewing this issue,
as Professor Michael Herz has pointed
out, is that the whole point of the "new
property" concept was that the property
interest derives "not from possession or
expectation but from legal entitlement"
and as to that, the current holder of the
entitlement and the applicant are "identically situated." '4
Of course for a benefit to qualify as an
entitlement, an applicant would have to
be able to show that the government is
compelled to provide the benefit if the
applicant meets the qualifications or eligibility requirements set forth in the statute
or regulations-in other words, that the
government's decision was not a discretionary one.And ofcourse, some government
benefits are discretionary-for example
in grant applications or applications for a
state scholarship or for a government job
subjective judgnents figure heavily in the
4 E-mail from Michael Herz to same forum as

described in note 3,supra (emphasis added).
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